SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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TJAj-State v. Tucker, 1994 WL 275350 (N.J. June 22,
1994).

AT

On October 10, 1989, police officers were patrolling Stuyvesant Avenue in Trenton, New Jersey, in a marked squad car when
they observed the defendant, Stanley Tucker, and another male
sitting on a curb. Id. at *1. Upon viewing the officers' vehicle,
Tucker immediately began running across the adjacent property
toward Rutherford Avenue. Consequently, the officers radioed for
assistance.
Two officers, patrolling nearby, answered the call and subsequently intercepted Tucker as he reached Rutherford Avenue.
One of the officers alighted from the patrol car and began to pursue Tucker, who started running back in the direction of Stuyvesant Avenue. As Tucker ran past the rear porch of a nearby house,
he threw a transparent plastic bag into an opening beneath the
porch. Moments later, Tucker ran directly into one of the officers
from the first squad car, who then apprehended him. Subsequently, the detaining officer retrieved the discarded plastic bag,
which was found to contain crack cocaine.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Law Division, denied Tucker's
motion to suppress the evidence. Id. at *2. Although the trial
court concluded that the officers lacked the requisite probable
cause or reasonable suspicion tojustify an arrest or an investigatory
stop, the court nevertheless reasoned that Tucker had abandoned
the cocaine by throwing it beneath the porch. Id.
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Tucker
pleaded guilty to third-degree possession of narcotics with the intent to distribute, in violation of the New Jersey statutes. Id. at *1
(citing N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a) (1) and (b) (3)). Consequently, the trial
court sentenced Tucker to a three-year period of conditional probation. Id.
Disavowing the trial court's grounds for denial, the appellate
division reversed. Id. at *2 (citing State v. Tucker, 265 N.J. Super.
358, 627 A.2d 174 (App. Div. 1993)). Although the court agreed
that the police officers had illegally seized Tucker, the court held
that Tucker's relinquishment of the cocaine was a direct result of
the unlawful seizure, rather than an abandonment. Id. (citing
Tucker, 265 N.J. Super at 360-61, 627 A.2d at 175).
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the State's petition
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for certification, as well as Tucker's cross-petition, to determine
whether Tucker had abandoned the cocaine, thereby entitling the
police officers to search the contraband without a warrant. Id. (citing State v. Tucker, 134 N.J. 567, 636 A.2d 524 (1993)). To resolve
this issue, the court first endeavored to determine whether the police officers had in fact seized Tucker within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at *1. In addition, the court sought to
ascertain whether such a seizure was justified. Id.
Affirming the appellate court's ruling, the New Jersey
Supreme Court determined that the police officers had unlawfully
seized Tucker by restraining his freedom of movement. Id. at *4.
Furthermore, the court ascertained that Tucker's flight provided
the police officers with neither the probable cause necessary to
support an arrest, nor the reasonable suspicion required to justify
an investigatory stop. Id. at *6. Therefore, the court concluded
that the officers' seizure of Tucker was unlawful. Id. Accordingly,
the court held that because Tucker discarded the cocaine after the
officers' unlawful seizure, the relinquishment did not qualify as an
abandonment, and therefore the evidence had to be excluded. Id.
at *8 (emphasis added).
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice O'Hern set the stage
for the court's analysis by resounding the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at *2. Recognizing that the resolution of Fourth
Amendment questions often turns on the court's definition of a
seizure, the justice endeavored to define the term. Id. As a preliminary matter, Justice O'Hern noted the State's reliance on the
United States Supreme Court's formulation of a seizure as enunciated in California v. Hodari D.. Id. (citing California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621 (1991) [hereinafter Hodan]).
The Court in Hodariwas similarly faced with a police officer's
pursuit of a suspect, Hodari, who fled upon viewing the officer's
patrol car. Id. (citation omitted). Just before the' officer tackled
him, Hodari discarded a bag of crack cocaine which was later recovered, identified, and offered into evidence against him. Id. (citation omitted). Following an unsuccessful motion to suppress,
Hodari appealed. Id. (citation omitted). The California Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, and excluded the cocaine
as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. Id. (citation omitted). The
United States Supreme Court, however, reversed because the police officer had not seized Hodari within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Hodari,499 U.S. at 626).
Justice O'Hern remarked that according to the Hodaricourt, a
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seizure under the Fourth Amendment requires either the application of physical force or a display of authority to which the suspect
yields. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, because Hodari did not submit to the officer's commands to stop, the Court held that the officer did not seize Hodari until he tackled him. Id. (citing Hodari,
499 U.S. at 629). Accordingly, the Hodaricourt concluded that the
bag of cocaine was not the product of an unlawful seizure because
it was discarded before the officer's application of physical force.
Id. (citation omitted).
Justice O'Hern next considered whether the New Jersey
Supreme Court should revise the State's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to comport with the views expressed in Hodari. Id. (citations omitted). Although the justice acknowledged the court's
desire to conform the State's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to
that of the federal constitution, the justice conceded that the court
had yet to abandon the principles promulgated in United States v.
Mendenhall in favor of the Supreme Court's more recent holding in
Hodari. Id. (citing United States v. Mendenhall,446 U.S. 544 (1980)).
According to the Mendenhall Court, the justice noted, a seizure
occurs when an individual's freedom of movement is restrained by
either physical force or a show of authority. Id. (quotation omitted). In addition, the court recited, under the Mendenhall formulation, a seizure does not occur under the Fourth Amendment
unless the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident
would lead a reasonable person to believe "that he was not free to
leave." Id. (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553-54).
Questioning the propriety of the Hodari Court's definition of a
seizure, Justice O'Hern noted the conceptual similarity between
Hodari's seizure analysis and the stringent mandates of the outdated trespass doctrine of property law. Id. at *3. As the justice
explained, proof of a constitutional invasion under the trespass
doctrine requires proof of a trespass and a seizure of tangible property. Id. (citation omitted). Justice O'Hern remarked that the
property-based principles once espoused by the courts have since
been subsumed by the reasonable expectation of privacy standard
enunciated in Katz v. United States. Id. (citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967)).
Pursuant to Katz, the court asserted, the determinative question in a Fourth Amendment analysis is whether the individual had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the matter seized. Id. (citation omitted). For example, Justice O'Hern offered, in State v.
Hempele the New Jersey Supreme Court did not question whether
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the accused had a property interest in the garbage searched, but
instead considered whether the accused had a reasonable expectation that evidence of his activities would be free from warrantless
searches by the government. Id. (citing State v. Hempele, 120 NJ.
182, 576 A.2d 793 (1990)).
Similarly, the justice noted, the NewJersey Supreme Court has
traditionally viewed search-and-seizure questions in terms of the
reasonableness of the government's exercise of authority to procure evidence of criminal activity. Id. Justice O'Hern offered Rawlings v. Police Dept. as an example of this doctrine. Id. (citing
Rawlings v. Police Dept., 133 N.J. 182, 627 A.2d 602 (1993)). In
Rawlings, the justice recalled, the court questioned whether the
government had a reasonable basis for compelling police officers
to submit to drug testing procedures. Id. (citation omitted).
Justice O'Hern applauded the court's traditional privacy-based
approach to search-and-seizure analyses. Id. As the justice reminded, the court has consistently viewed the guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment in terms of protecting the reasonable expectations of individuals to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects." Id. (quoting N.J. CONST. art. I, 7). Continuing, the
court criticized the Hodari Court's elementary reliance on dictionary definitions of seizure. Id. Specifically, Justice O'Hern proposed that such a narrow approach to search-and-seizure analysis
would likely frustrate the very purpose of the Fourth Amendment
and its intended benefits. Id. (citation omitted).
Concluding, Justice O'Hem recognized that conforming New
Jersey's Fourth Amendment doctrine to that expressed in Hodari
would require too radical a departure from New Jersey's existing
search-and-seizure law. Id. As a result, the court refused to adopt
the Hodari Court's ruling, choosing instead to decide Tucker on
state constitutional grounds, and in accordance with existing precedent. Id. (citing State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820
(1987); State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 517 A.2d 859 (1986)).
Having laid a foundation for the court's analysis, Justice
O'Hern began synthesizing law and fact. Id. at *4. Mindful that
resolution of Fourth Amendment inquiries requires objective consideration of each circumstance surrounding the encounter at issue, the justice delivered a detailed recitation of the facts. Id.
(citation omitted). Although acknowledging that the officers
neither commanded Tucker to stop nor displayed any weapons,
the court nonetheless concluded that Tucker could have reason-
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ably surmised that he was not free to leave from the officers' movements. Id.
Specifically, Justice O'Hern recalled that the officers immediately began to pursue Tucker when he fled. Id. In addition, the
court noted that the officers in the first squad car swiftly radioed
for assistance in an attempt to trap Tucker with a blockade of
squad cars. Id. In light of Tucker's inevitable perception of these
rapidly unfolding events, Justice O'Hern concluded that Tucker
could have reasonably discerned that the police were attempting to
capture him. Id. In turn, the court recognized the unlikelihood
that a person in Tucker's position would reasonably feel free to
terminate the encounter. Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, Justice O'Hern held that the police officers had properly seized
Tucker under the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citations omitted).
The court next considered whether the seizure was justified.
Id. Specifically, Justice O'Hern questioned whether flight alone
may give rise to the level of cause required to support a seizure. Id.
at *6. Acknowledging the broad spectrum of situations which a
police officer may encounter in the field on a daily basis, the court
recognized the need for a degree of flexibility in police procedure.
Id. at *4-5 (citations omitted).
In particular, Justice O'Hern emphasized that a police officer
must be afforded the latitude to conduct street interrogations on
evidence falling short of probable cause for arrest. Id. at *5 (citation omitted). Analogizing to the court's ruling in State v. Smith, in
which the court vindicated a police officer's right to order a passenger out of his vehicle based upon a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, Justice O'Hern proffered that an officer must likewise
be permitted to question a suspect on the street based on a reasonable suspicion. Id. (citing State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 637 A.2d 158
(1994)). In support of the court's conclusion, Justice O'Hern referred to the landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio, in which the
United States Supreme Court stressed that circumstances will often
obligatepolice officers to stop individuals on the street to investigate
suspicious activity. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968))
(emphasis added).
Emphasizing the New Jersey courts' adherence to the principles set forth in Terry, Justice O'Hern referred to recent decisions
of the court which either anticipated or reflected the Terry Court's
holding. Id. (citing State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536, 553-54, 636 A.2d
505, 513 (1994) (holding that an officer's reasonable suspicion
that individual was engaged in illegal activity justified the officer's

450

SETON HALL LAW REVJEW

[Vol. 25:445

frisk); Davis, 104 N.J. at 5.07, 517 A.2d at 868 (declaring that an
officer's reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in illegal
activity justified the officer's seizure of the defendant); State v. Dilley, 49 N.J. 460, 464, 231 A.2d 353, 355 (1967) (noting that a police
officer's duty to prevent criminal activity will often require him to
conduct investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion)).
Moreover, the justice observed that determining the reasonableness of the stop requires the court to consider all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, including the basis for the
officer's suspicion and the nature and degree of the detention. Id.
(citing Diey, 49 N.J. at 468, 231 A.2d at 357). Furthermore, Justice
O'Hern acknowledged that additional information needed to sustain probable cause may be provided by an individual's reaction to
a properly limited Teny encounter, such as flight. Id. (citations
omitted). Thus, the justice recognized that a police officer would
have broader latitude to subject an individual to an investigatory
stop under circumstances indicating illegal activity. Id. at *6.
Although the court realized that a suspect's flight will often
give rise to a suspicion of unlawful conduct, Justice O'Hern warned
that flight alone, absent some evidence of criminality, may not be
deemed evidence of guilt. Id. The justice explained that flight is
but one consideration in assessing guilt. Id. It is not, the court
reminded, a determinative factor unless accompanied by some corroborating evidence of criminality, Id. To illustrate, Justice
O'Hern referred to the court's model jury charges which instruct
against assessing guilt on the basis of flight alone. Id. (citing
MODEL JURY CHARGES (CIMINAL), Flight (November 18, 1991)).
In addition, Justice O'Hern made reference to State v. Sullivan, in
which the court stated that flight may not be the basis for a finding
of guilt absent unexplained circumstances which can reasonably be
inferred to be a conscious act to avoid guilt. Id. (citing State v.
Sullivan, 43 N.J. 209, 238-39, 203 A.2d 177, 192 (1964)).
Rejecting the Hodari Court's perception that "'[t] he wicked
flee when no man pursueth,"' Justice O'Hern acknowledged the
reality that innocent citizens in today's modern society may not feel
comfortable in the presence of police officers. Id. (quoting Hodari,
499 U.S. at 623 n.1). Distinguishing the case at bar from the appellate division's disposition in State v. Doss,Justice O'Hern explained
that the Tucker record did not disclose the rationale which led the
police officers to pursue Tucker. Id. (citation omitted). For example, the court observed, the instant record was void of any evidence
indicating criminal activity or suspicious conduct. Id. (citing
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Tucker, 265 N.J. Super. at 360, 627 A.2d at 175): Affirming the appellate division's observation that the only reason the police chased
the defendant was because he had fled, Justice O'Hern held that
the police officers unjustifiably and unlawfully seized Tucker under
the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Tucker, 265 N.J. Super. at 360,
627 A.2d 174).
Having determined that the police officers' seizure was unlawful, Justice O'Hern proceeded to consider whether Tucker nonetheless abandoned the evidence. Id. at *7. As a preliminary
matter, the justice explained that resolution of the abandonment
issue would turn on the court's findings with respect to the legality
of the officers' seizure. Id. To illustrate, the court referred to
Michigan v. Chesternut, in which the Supreme Court implied that
property which is discarded pursuant to an unlawful seizure should
be suppressed. Id. (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574
(1988)).
Continuing, Justice O'Hern noted the trial court's reliance on
State v. Farinich, in which the appellate division defined abandonment in terms of the suspect's intent to retrieve the discarded
property. Id. (citing State v. Farinich, 179 N.J. Super. 1, 430 A.2d
233 (App. Div. 1981), affd, 89 N.J. 378, 446 A.2d 120 (1982)). Specifically, the justice recalled, the Farinichcourt held that where circumstances indicate that the suspect had no intentions of
retrieving the discarded property, the suspect has abandoned the
property, thereby entitling the police to search the property without a warrant. Id. Discrediting the trial court's reliance on
Farinich,Justice O'Hern distinguished that case from the case at
bar, explaining that the police officers' seizure of Farinich was lawfully based on a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Id.
The court next considered the propriety of relying on dictionary definitions of abandonment in a Fourth Amendment context.
Id. Acknowledging that the dictionary defines abandonment as
"the voluntary relinquishment of all right, title, claim and possession, with the intention of not reclaiming it," the justice nonetheless expressed the court's adherence to the principles enunciated
by Professor LaFave. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 2 (5th ed.
1979)). According to Professor LaFave, the court asserted, property is not abandoned simply because a person discards incriminating articles while being unlawfully searched by police officers. Id.
(citation omitted). As a result, Justice O'Hern noted, where a person has discarded property in response to an unlawful seizure,
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courts have labelled the property inadmissible. Id. (citation
omitted).
Thus, having already determined that the officers' seizure was
unlawful, Justice O'Hern proceeded to consider whether Tucker
discarded the cocaine as a result of that illegal seizure. Id. at *8
(emphasis added). Continuing, the justice noted that the court's
resolution of that issue would turn on whether the act of abandonment and the unlawful seizure were sufficiently attenuated to justify admission of the evidence. Id. (citation omitted). Answering
this question in the negative, Justice O'Hern held that because the
seizure was unreasonable, there was no abandonment, and Tucker
was therefore entitled to suppression of the evidence. Id.
Summarizing, Justice O'Hern recognized that police officers
need more tools to combat the increase of crime in the country Id.
(citation omitted). Specifically, the justice recognized that police
officers must often conduct investigatory stops to investigate suspicious activity. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16). Nevertheless,
the court continued, an investigatory stop which is unsupported by
a reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct constitutes an illegal
seizure. Id. Regrettably, Justice O'Hern lamented, such was the
case when officers' seized Tucker without just cause. Id. Therefore, the court pronounced, because Tucker discarded the evidence following the officers' unlawful seizure, the evidence must
be suppressed. Id.
Once again the New Jersey Supreme Court has gone beyond
its federal counterpart to ensure the security of its residents. Disregarding the Hodari Court's lead, Justice O'Hern continued the
NewJersey court's adherence to a more stringent standard for determining the propriety of police conduct. Refusing to adopt the
United States Supreme Court's most recent formulation of a
seizure,Justice O'Hern expressed the NewJerseyjudiciary's preference for a privacy-based definition of seizure, which requires
neither physical force nor submission to police authority. Pursuant
to Tucker, a seizure occurs under the New Jersey constitution if the
detained individual reasonably believes that he is not free to leave.
Similarly, refusing to be bound by the confines of literal interpretation, Justice O'Hern declined to adopt the United States Supreme
Court's dictionary definition of abandonment. Instead, Justice
O'Hern instructed that a suspect does not abandon evidence if the
evidence is discarded pursuant to an illegal seizure.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is both exceedingly intricate and highly controversial. Debates surrounding the Fourth
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Amendment derive, in large part, from the longstanding tug-of-war
that exists between the competing interests of the government and
its citizens. Indeed, courts faced with search-and-seizure questions
are continually under the gun to balance individual privacy rights
against the growing needs of law enforcement. Although Tucker is
likely to spawn solicitude among those who ascribe to the government's cause, Justice O'Hern will surely be lauded by those who
champion personal privacy.
Stacey P. Rapaport
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ADMITTED AT TRIAL-State v. Michaels, 1994 WL 278424 (NJ.

June 23, 1994).
Margaret Kelly Michaels was hired by the Wee Care Day Nursery ("Wee Care") in September of 1984 as a teacher's aide. 1994
WL Id. at *1. In early October of the same year, she was promoted

to the position of teacher, even though she had no previous teaching experience. Wee Care's staff consisted of eight teachers, two
administrators, and several aides. Michaels's classroom was located

in the basement, along with the other nursery class for three year
old children. A vinyl curtain separated the two classrooms.
Michaels resigned from Wee Care on April 26, 1985. During
the course of her seven months at the center, no complaints were
filed against her by parents, pupils, or any other staff member.
Teachers and parents, however, later revealed that they noticed
changes in the children's behavior from the time Michaels was promoted to teacher.
On the same day that Michaels resigned, M.P., one of the children in Michaels's class, revealed to his mother that each day at
nap time Michaels disrobed him and took his temperature rectally.

Id. at *2. This disclosure occurred during a pediatrician's visit
while the doctor's nurse took M.P.'s temperature. M.P.'s mother
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never informed the doctor of her son's remarks, and thus the doctor did not examine M.P.'s rectum. When M.P.'s mother questioned M.P. further, he informed her that Michaels had also
performed similar acts on two other children and that she hurt
them. M.P. also stated that Michaels "usel[d] the white jean stuff."
Although his mother did not understand to what her son was referring, investigators later found Vaseline and white first-aid cream on
the premises of Wee Care.
M.P.'s mother notified both the director of Wee Care and the
New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services ("DYFS") of the
alleged sexual abuse of her son. DYFS, in turn, related the charges
to the Essex County Prosecutor's office who initiated an investigation. The preliminary inquiry involved interviewing several students attending the Wee Care center and their parents.
Additionally, Michaels succumbed to approximately nine hours of
questioning and successfully completed a lie detector test. The
prosecutor's office and DYFS followed up the original investigation
with extensive interviews and examinations of Wee Care pupils.
The prosecutor's office initially charged Michaels, on June 6,
1985, with three counts of sexual abuse of three boys. On July 30,
1985, a second indictment charged Michaels with an additional
174 counts relating to twenty boys and girls who attended Wee
Care. The final indictment, filed November 21, 1985, increased
the charges by fifty-five more counts involving fifteen additional
children from the center. Before the opening day of trial, the prosecution dropped seventy-two counts, and proceeded on the remaining charges.
At trial, the prosecution's case relied primarily on the testimony of the children. This testimony, to a large extent, referred
back to the pretrial statements the children made during the
course of the investigatory interviews. The State produced little
physical evidence to corroborate the allegations of sexual molestation. Ultimately, the jury convicted Michaels on 115 counts, including aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, endangering the
welfare of children, and terroristic threats. Id. at *3. As a result,
the court sentenced Michaels to forty-seven years in prison, with
parole ineligibility for the first fourteen years. Id.
Reversing the trial court and remanding the case, id. at *1 (citing State v. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. 579 (App. Div. 1993)), the
appellate court determined that the investigators conducted their
interviews with the children in a highly improper manner. Id. at *3
(citing Michaels, 264 NJ. Super. at 629). The court explained that
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the improper procedures followed by the investigators tainted the
children's recall, and therefore the claims appeared to be based on
unreliable perceptions. Id. (quoting Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. at
631-32). Such impropriety, the court reasoned, was dangerous because it could lead to unfair trials. Id. (citing Michaels, 264 N.J.
Super. at 631-32). The court ultimately held that in the event that
the state chose to re-prosecute, the trial court would have to convene a pretrial hearing to evaluate the reliability of the children's
out-of-court statements and in-court testimony. Id. (citing Michaels,
264 N.J. Super. at 631-32).
The State petitioned for certification to review the appellate
court's determinations. Id. at *1. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey denied certification with prejudice on all issues, except for
the ruling regarding the need for a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the children's in-court testimony. Id. On the limited issue
of the pretrial hearing, the court permitted the State to file a motion for reconsideration of its petition if it intended to retry the
case. Id. The State filed its motion, and the court granted certification. Id. (citing State v. Michaels, 134 N.J. 482 (1993)).
Justice Handler authored the opinion for a unanimous court.
Id. at *14. Thejustice framed the issue as whether the state's interview techniques undermined the credibility of the children's statements and testimony at trial to such a degree that a pretrial
hearing was necessary to determine the admissibility of the evidence at re-trial. Id. at *3. The court explained that the complexity of this issue necessitated a highly nuanced inquest into the
totality of the circumstances concerning the interviews conducted
by the state agents. Id. Likening the inculpatory statements of sexual abuse to confessions and identification, the court instructed
that such evidence requires special measures to ensure reliability.
Id.
Justice Handler suggested that implicit in the overall question
at hand was the issue of the susceptibility of children to coercive
and suggestive questioning. Id. The justice, however, preserved
for another day whether, as a class, children are more open to manipulation than adults. Id. at *4. The court noted the appellate
division's review of the growing scholarly material on the issue of
children's vulnerability to inappropriate interview techniques, and
pointed out that one central theme reoccurred throughout the various theories. Id. at *3 (citing Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. at 622).
The justice identified this theme as a general concern over an interviewer's power to distort a child's memory of an event through
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improper and highly suggestive interview practices. Id. The court
repeated the appellate division's finding that because of their
highly coercive or suggestive nature, certain interview techniques
irremediably alter a child's perception. Id.
Before commencing his analysis, Justice Handler reaffirmed
the New Jersey Supreme Court's commitment to the premise that
children are not inherently a suspect class of witnesses. Id. at *4.
The justice reiterated that age alone fails to render a witness incompetent. Id. (citing State in reR.R, 79 N.J. 97 (1979)). Although
accepting this proposition, the justice also recognized that children's susceptibility to manipulation is currently a hotly debated
issue. Id. Moreover, the court acknowledged that despite the
highly reliable nature of children's accounts in some circumstances, the immaturity, vulnerability, and impressionability of children create special cause for concern regarding the credibility of
their testimony, especially in the area of sexual molestation. Id.
(citations omitted).
The court then began its analysis by agreeing with the appellate division that the most crucial and most determinative point of
investigating and prosecuting a child-sex-abuse case is the investigative interview. Id. at *5 (citing Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. at 622-23)
(other citation omitted). The court stated, as an accepted doctrine, that coercive or suggestive investigatory interviews of young
children can affect children's recollections of events. Id. Such influence, the court warned, compromises the reliability of the children's statements regarding the actual events. Id.
The court surveyed the writings of practitioners, scholars, and
experts in order to delineate those factors that weigh heavily on
determining if an investigatory interview warped a child's recollection of sexual abuse. See id. Justice Handler then composed a list
of the factors that academic literature agreed upon as improper
interview practices, including: (1) whether the inquiry lacked investigatory independence; (2) whether the interviewer pursued a
line of questioning that indicated that the interviewer had a
preconceived notion of the child's experience; (3) whether the interviewer asked leading questions; (4) whether the investigator
failed to account for the effect of outside influences on the child's
descriptions, i.e., prior conversations the child had with other children or his/her parents; (5) whether the child did not view the
interviewer as a trusted authority figure; and (6) whether the interviewer lacked conviction regarding the presumption of innocence.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The court elaborated on two additional factors in greater detail. See id. First, the court declared that incessantly repeating the
same question after the child has already answered it, injects an
element of manipulation into the interview. Id. Justice Handler
expounded that when an interviewer poses the exact same question to a child, immediately after the child has answered the question, it is normal for the child to assume that s/he answered the
question incorrectly and that s/he should change the answer to
please the interviewer. Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, the
justice charged, the insidious nature of these questions grows
when, over time, this type of questioning suggests to the child that
abuse did in fact occur. Id. (citation omitted).
Justice Handler also stressed that explicit vilification or criticism of the accused can subtly and unduly influence a child's responses. Id. (citation omitted). In discussing the effect an
interviewer's bias can have on the correctness of a child's recollection, the court clarified that tone of voice, praise, cajoling, mild
threats, peer pressure, and bribes and rewards can all induce a
child to alter the recollection of what actually occurred. Id.
The justice further noted that the appellate division, as well as
other courts, have acknowledged that there is considerable authority for the proposition that improper interview practices can have a
deleterious impact on children's recollections. Id. (citing Michaels,
264 N.J. Super. at 629-34) (other citations omitted). The court
warned that the negative effects of such impropriety are even more
conspicuous when dealing with young children. Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, the court posited that studies regarding children's memories emphasize the importance of properly conducted
interviews in order to elicit accurate and consistent descriptions of
events. Id. (citations omitted).
The majority buttressed this theory by citing to the common
standards of conducting interviews of young children that are adhered to by government and law enforcement agencies. See id.
The justice imparted that the National Center for the Prosecution
of Child Abuse, the National District Attorney's Association, and
the American Prosecutor's Research Institute have conjunctively
adopted guidelines delineating the proper interrogation methods
to employ with alleged child-abuse victims. Id. Justice Handler articulated that the guidelines instruct interviewers to remain open,
objective, and neutral; to avoid leading questions; to refrain from
ever threatening a child; to avoid coercing an unwilling child into
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talking; and to forego the use of peer pressure, i.e., telling the
child what other children have stated. Id. (citations omitted).
The court also examined the guidelines promulgated by the
NewJersey Governor's Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect. Id.
This task force, the court observed, encourages investigators to
elicit a child's reaction to his or her alleged attacker and the surrounding events, but admonished investigators not to offer adverse
commentary about the accused. Id. (citation omitted) Furthermore, the court mentioned that the guidelines frown upon multiple interviews with a variety of different investigators. Id. (citation
omitted).
In concluding its analysis of the law, the court surveyed judicial treatment of interview standards, and discovered that courts
address the same concerns as the academic literature and the governmental agencies. Id. at *7. In particular, the court referred to
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Idaho v. Wright. Id.
(citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990)). The majority recounted that the Wright Court approved of the Idaho Supreme
Court's ruling that several highly improper interview techniques,
in conjunction with the children's susceptibility to manipulative
questioning, proved to be a recipe for undependable testimony
and statements from the children. Id. (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at
812-13). The practices in question in Wright, the court noted, were
the use of flagrantly leading questions, the absence of video-taped
interviews with the supposed child-victims, and the interviewer's
apparent bias regarding what the children should be reporting. Id.
(citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 812-13). Upon this strong consensus
among scholars, practitioners, experts, and the courts, Justice Handler declared that the use of highly suggestive or coercive interrogation techniques increased the risk that the interview itself would
destroy a child's memory of the events, and consequently calls into
question the reliability of the child's out-of-court statements and
subsequent testimony. Id.
The court then examined the facts of the Michaels' case
against the interrogation standards condemned by the legal community. See id. Before entering into any in-depth analysis, the justice forewarned that investigators in this case employed almost all
of the techniques rejected by experts and practitioners. Id. Admitting that one child's voluntary account of Michaels's conduct instigated the initial investigation, the court stressed that an
overwhelming majority of the interrogations did not rely on the
spontaneous recall of the children. Id. (citations omitted). In fact,
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the court recounted that none of the children described actual sexual abuse through free-recall. Id. Additionally, very few of the
pupils directly accused Michaels of misconduct, or supplied any
specific recollections of sexual abuse without prodding from the
interviewers. Id. The justice reminded that voluntary, spur-of-themoment recollections are the most reliable. Id.
The court further criticized the competency of the interviewers themselves. See id. The court reproved that the investigators
lacked proper training regarding how to question pre-schoolers,
demonstrated ineptness in handling young children, and openly
exhibited their frustrations over communicating with the children.
Id. Furthermore, the court lamented that the investigators failed
to record the earliest interviews, and destroyed some of their original notes. Id. In fact, the justice reported, fifty-percent of the earliest interviews were never recorded on audio or video tape. Id. at
*7 n.1. The court observed that experts uniformly agree that initial
interviews should be video-taped. Id. (citations omitted).
The justice also questioned the objectivity of the interviewers.
See id. at *8. The court illustrated how the interviewers had converted the children into victims, as opposed to alleged victims, as
well as convicted Michaels before they had even spoken with the
children. Id. The justice concluded that both the interviewers'
failure to question outlandish accusations by the children and the
interviewers' reluctance to pursue any hypothesis that might support Michaels' innocence evidenced the lack of objectivity. Id. Justice Handler quoted one investigator, in particular, who perceived
the interviews as the first step in the children's healing process,
and believed it was his professional and ethical duty to alleviate the
emotional stress that the underlying events had caused the children. Id.
In terms of the actual questions asked, the court recounted
that the record reflected blatant use of leading questions, were subjected to incessant interrogation of the children, and the use of
cajoling, bribing, and mild threats to elicit the responses sought.
Id. Furthermore, the court found that the record revealed pervasive vilification of Michaels' character. Id. Several of the children,
the justice stated, were told that Michaels was in jail because she
had done very bad things to them, and that the police needed the
children's help to keep her there. Id. The court also reported that
other children were introduced to the arresting officer, shown the
handcuffs placed on Michaels, and presented with mock police
badges if they cooperated. Id.
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Lastly, the court chastened that outside influences may have
also tainted the children's perceptions of the events at Wee Care.
Id. The court cited the appellate division's observation that the
children saw each other and most likely talked about Michaels and
the case. Id. (citing Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. at 629). Indeed, the
court pointed out that investigators pressured seventeen of the
thirty-four pupils by telling them that other children had described
acts of sexual abuse inflicted by Michaels. Id.
Ultimately, the court charged that the investigators committed
egregious violations of acceptable interview techniques. Id. Accordingly, the justice affirmed the appellate division's finding that
the investigators utilized highly coercive and suggestive interrogation methods. Id. at *9. The court agreed that before any of the
statements could be admitted or any of the children could testify, a
pretrial hearing would be required. Id.
Finally, Justice Handler discussed the importance of admitting
only that evidence which exhibits sufficient reliability to assist the
fact finder in the ultimate decision of guilt or innocence. Id. The
justice emphasized the due process concerns implicated in determining the admissibility of evidence. See id. (citations omitted).
Further, the court advised that inculpatory evidence generated
from an unreliable source spotlights due process concerns. Id.
The court admitted that trial courts do not generally evaluate
the reliability of in-court testimony prior to its admission. Id.
Those determinations, the court conceded, are usually reserved for
out-of-court statements. Id. The justice asserted, however, that
such hearings are not novel when the integrity of the judicial process has been weakened by improper conduct of the police or prosecutors. Id. (citations omitted). The court elaborated that pretrial
hearings become necessary to cleanse the pending prosecution of
any semblance of corruption. Id. (citations omitted).
Justice Handler first addressed the reliability of the children's
pretrial statements. See id. The court articulated, that like all pretrial statements, any inquiry into the reliability of a child-sex-abuse
victims' statements must encompass all relevant factors. Id. (citing
Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. at 633). The court identified the factors
bearing on the reliability of an alleged child-victim's out-of court
statement to include: (1) to whom did the child make the statement; (2) was the statement provided under conditions that encouraged truthfulness; (3) whether the child's description
demonstrated an unusually sophisticated understanding or familiarity with sexual functions, and sex itself; (4) did the child exhibit
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post-recitation or post-event distress; (5) did any physical evidence
of the abuse exist; and (6) did the defendant's statement or confession corroborate the child's description of the events. Id. (citing
State v. D.RA, 109 N.J. 348, 348 (1988)). The court also enunciated
that the factors to be considered in evaluating the reliability of a
sexual offense complaint include: (1) the victim's age; (2) the relationship between the victim and the interrogator; (3) the circumstances of the questioning; and (4) the type of questions posed. Id.
(citing State v. Hill, 121 N.J. 150, 168 (1990)) (other citations
omitted).
Turning next to the reliability of the in-court testimony of the
children, the court proffered that the same concerns exist for incourt testimony and out-of-court statements. Id. The court further
analogized the in-court testimony question to the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony. Id. Justice Handler recognized
that the United States Supreme Court requires pretrial hearings to
determine reliability and admissibility of in-court testimony when
unduly suggestive identification techniques are utilized. Id. (citing
Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)).
The court noted the similarities between the two means of acquiring evidence. Id. The pretrial identification procedure, the
justice remarked, like the investigatory interview stage of a childsex-abuse case, can be a crucial moment in a criminal prosecution.
Id. Both of these procedures, the justice expounded, are riddled
with innumerable pitfalls and variable factors that could compromise the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. (citing United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230 (1967)). Furthermore, the court attested
that the corrosive effects of any improper suggestions made during
either of these procedures are difficult, if not impossible, to reverse
or counter at trial. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Handler emphasized that when an identification is central to the prosecution's
case, the court must order a hearing to rigorously test the reliability
and admissibility of the testimony. Id. at *11.
In addition to comparing the in-court testimony of alleged
child-sexual-abuse victims to eye witness testimony, the justice examined the court's treatment of pretrial hearings when the witness's memory may have been manipulated by suggestive
inferences. Id. The court cited State v. Hurd to demonstrate that
any inference of manipulation of the witness's recollection calls for
a pretrial hearing regarding reliability. Id. (citing State v. Hurd, 86
N.J. 525 (1981)). Justice Handler agreed with the Hurd court that
recollection based on hypnosis warranted a pretrial hearing to in-
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sure that the hypnotic procedure used was reasonably reliable. Id.
(citing Hurd, 86 N.J. at 543).
Turning to the case at bar, Justice Handler suggested that the
facts presented a situation even more crucial than those mentioned
above because, in this case, the pretrial events related to the actual
occurrence of the offense, not simply the identification of the perpetrator. Id. The justice found the investigatory interviews fraught
with instances of improper suggestiveness that endangered the reliability of the evidence procured. Id. Thus, the court once again
concurred with the appellate division that the facts of this case necessitated a pretrial hearing. Id. (citing Michaels, 264 N.J. at 63132).
In concluding the opinion, Justice Handler addressed some
procedural issues relating to the pretrial hearing. See id. The court
reminded that the pretrial hearing should be conducted according
to Evidence Rule 104. Id. Furthermore, the court framed the issue to be addressed at the hearing as whether the investigatory interviews were so unduly suggestive that they irreparably tainted the
children's recollections. Id.
The court reiterated that children, as a class, are not per se incompetent as witnesses. Id. Based on this assumption, the court
announced that the defendant bears the burden of showing "some
evidence" that the children's statements resulted from unduly suggestive and coercive interview practices. Id. (citations omitted).
In reviewing the methods used by the investigators in this case, the
justice found that this threshold standard was met, but also urged
that the facts of this case were not to limit the circumstances under
which this burden of proof can be satisfied. Id. at *12.
Once the defendant meets his/her burden of proof, the court
declared, the burden shifts to the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proffered statements maintain their reliability. Id. (citing Hurd, 86 N.J. at 546). The justice surmised that
the remaining issue concerned whether the children's statements
retain sufficient reliability to outweigh the tainting effects of unacceptable interrogation practices. Id.
Justice Handler advised the State that it may call expert witnesses to testify that the suggestive capacity of the investigatory
techniques in question did not damage the children's memories to
such a degree as to render their statements and testimonies inadmissible. Id. The court further suggested that the defense could
counter these experts with its own arsenal of experts. Id. The justice cautioned, however, that neither side's expert testimony could
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approach the ultimate issue of credibility for each child witness. Id.
(citation omitted).
The court defended its selection of the clear and convincing
standard, as opposed to a more stringent one, stating that it protects the defendant's right to a fair trial without hindering the prosecution of child-sexual-abuse cases. Id. at *13. The court found
that, despite the ineptitude of the investigation team, the facts did
not warrant a higher standard of proof because no evidence existed to imply conscious bad faith. Id. Furthermore, the court admonished, future investigations should proceed with this decision
in mind, and thus cause prosecutors and investigation teams to act
more prudently, and modify their practices if necessary. Id.
Hypothesizing that the hearing would result in the admission
of some portion of the children's statements and testimonies, the
court added that the probative worth and weight to be assigned to
such evidence remains a function of the jury. Id. As an aid to the
jury, the court suggested, experts may testify to the suggestive or
coercive propensities of the interview techniques in question. Id.
Justice Handler further instructed that the jury must consider all
the surrounding circumstances and make no inferences from the
courts admission of the evidence. Id. (citations omitted).
Justice Handler concluded by finding that the interrogation
procedures used in this case were highly improper, thus bringing
into question the reliability of the evidence procured. Id. at *14.
Accordingly, the court held that if the State chose to retry the case
against Michaels, a pretrial hearing must be convened at which the
prosecution would prove by clear and convincing evidence that despite inappropriate interviewing techniques, the children's statements and in-court testimony maintained sufficient reliability. Id.
The court commented that the State faces a formidable challenge
in light of the egregious abuses committed by the investigatory
team, but reiterated that whatever evidence survives and makes it
to trial must ultimately be analyzed by the jury. Id.
The Michaels court wisely and adeptly separated out the pertinent legal issues of the case from the highly charged and emotional context in which they arose. This statement is not to imply
that the court ignored the practical effects of its decision, but by
concentrating on the legal issues, the court fashioned a rule that
balances both the alleged perpetrator's right to a fair trial and the
prosecutor's ability to build a successful case.
The court's determination that there existed a high
probability that the children's recollections were tainted, left the
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court with only two options. The first alternative was to per se preclude the use of evidence obtained through egregiously improper
investigatory techniques. Id. The second choice was to require a
pre-trial hearing in order to assess the reliability of the evidence.
The hearing allows each side to present arguments for and against
the deleterious effects of the improper practices utilized. The latter option obviously proves the more equitable to both sides and is
in accordance with the basic tenets of an adversarial system. Furthermore, this direction agrees with the policy concerns behind
the rules of evidence to maximize the truth-seeking process while
ensuring the reliability and accuracy of the proof presented.
While the bottom-line fact that Margaret Kelly Michaels remains free on a so-called technicality disturbs some people, the result is the only fair one. In our judicial system, a defendant is
innocent until proven guilty, and the substance of the proof to convict should be accurate and dependable, not a series of
fabrications. Unfortunately for the alleged victims in the Michaels
case, the methods utilized by the investigators created the appearance, if not the actual existence, of such fabrications. The court
could not close its eyes to the uncertainty of the evidence in this
case, and still afford Michaels the trial she is constitutionally
guaranteed.
Ideally, the objective of a trial is to find out the truth about a
particular course of events. No one would dispute that our system
is far from perfect, but that is all the more reason for judges to
earnestly endeavor as gatekeepers to omit unreliable evidence. After all, if the importance of reliable evidence is cast aside, the
scenes in our courtrooms may start to look more and more like the
Salem witch trials of another era.
Lana H. Schwartzman
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CRIMINAL LAW-JuRY INSTRUCTIONS-BY VIEWING A PASSION/
PROVOCATION MANSLAUGHTER JURY CHARGE IN ITS ENTIRETY,

SEQUENTIAL ERROR,

A

A SUBSEQUENT CURATIVE INSTRUCTION AND

THE FAILURE TO SPECIFY THAT THE STATE CARRIED THE BURDEN
OF PROOF DID NOT RESULT IN AN IMPROPER MURDER VERDICT-

State v. Heslop, 135 NJ. 318, 639 A.2d 1100 (1994).
On April 26, 1991, the defendant went to the residence of his
estranged wife to retrieve his belongings. Id. at 320, 639 A.2d at
1101. Finding that the locks to the apartment had been changed,
the defendant retrieved a crow bar from his vehicle to gain entry
into the apartment. When he returned to the apartment, the defendant saw his wife inside and commanded her to open the door.
In response, the defendant's wife opened the door with a knife in
her hand. The defendant then pushed his wife inside the apartment where a struggle ensued. Id. at 320-21, 639 A.2d at 1101.
When the defendant's wife ran from the apartment, the defendant
followed her outside where the skirmish continued. Id. at 321, 639
A.2d at 1101. Eventually, the defendant's wife fled to a nearby barbershop where, despite her screams for help, the defendant
stabbed her to death.
Subsequently, ajury convicted the defendant of murder. Id. at
319, 639 A.2d at 1100. The trial court's jury charge, however, contained two defects. Id. First, the instructions failed to explain the
proper sequence for deliberation on murder and lesser-included
manslaughter offenses. Id. Second, the trial court never explicitly
specified that the State, and not the defendant, carried the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of passion or
provocation. Id.
Rejecting the defendant's assertion that the errors prejudiced
the jury, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, upheld
the defendant's murder conviction. Id. at 320, 322, 639 A.2d at
1100, 1101-02. Furthermore, the Appellate Division doubted that
the facts, even when viewed in favor of the defendant, could support a jury finding of passion/provocation manslaughter. Id. at
322, 639 A.2d at 1102 (quotation omitted). The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted certification and affirmed the decision of
the Appellate Division. Id. at 320, 639 A.2d at 1100-01 (citation
omitted). The majority held that, viewed in its entirety, the jury
charge did not give rise to an improper verdict. Id. at 328, 639
A.2d at 1105.
Justice Handler, writing for the majority, began the court's
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analysis by noting that a jury instruction on murder and manslaughter that contains a sequential error is defective. Id. at 322,
639 A.2d at 1102 (citing State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 574 A.2d 951
(1990)). Specifically, the majority explained that a trial court's sequential error may cause a jury to presume, incorrectly, that passion/provocation manslaughter must be considered only if the jury
fails to find purposeful and knowing murder. Id. (citation omitted). In the instant case, however, the majority observed that the
trial court gave the jury a curative instruction prior to deliberation.
Id. at 323, 639 A.2d at 1102. Ultimately, the court found that the
subsequent charge correctly stated that passion/provocation manslaughter should be considered together and in conjunction with
purposeful or knowing murder. Id.
Additionally, Justice Handler emphasized that jury instructions should be considered as a whole to determine the total effect
on the jury. Id. at 324, 639 A.2d at 1103. Clarifying, the majority
asserted that individual parts of the jury charge should not be examined in isolation. Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, the court concluded that the complete set of jury instructions successfully
corrected the initial sequential error. Id.
Examining the second error, Justice Handler noted that the
trial court failed to inform the jury that the State carried the burden of proving the absence of passion or provocation beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. The majority recognized that such an omission may cause ajury to assume that the defendant carries the burden of proving the existence of passion or provocation. Id. The
court concluded, however, that despite the trial court's error, the
omission did not induce the jury to believe that the defendant bore
the burden of proving the existence of passion and provocation.
Id. at 325, 639 A.2d at 1103. Moreover, the majority observed that
the trial court directed the jury to consider passion/provocation
while deliberating on knowing and purposeful murder. Id. at 327,
639 A.2d at 1104. Accordingly, Justice Handler concluded that the
error did not result in an improper murder conviction. Id. at 328,
639 A.2d at 1105.
Addressing the dissent, the court criticized Justice Stein's narrow focus on individual words within the jury charge. Id. at 325,
639 A.2d at 1103. Reiterating the importance of the overall effect
of the charge on the jury, the majority maintained that the dissent
failed to acknowledge the common sense and ordinary understanding imparted by the court's instruction. Id. at 325, 639 A.2d
at 1103. Contrary to the dissent, Justice Handler concluded that
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the evidence supported the jury's verdict. Id. at 327, 639 A.2d at
1105.
Dissenting, Justice Stein stressed the fact that proper jury
charges are essential to a fair trial. Id. at 328, 639 A.2d at 1105
(quotation omitted) (Stein, J., dissenting). In addition, having reviewed the record, Justice Stein concluded that the evidence rationally supported a finding of passion/provocation manslaughter.
Id. at 331-32, 639 A.2d at 1107 (Stein, J., dissenting). Therefore,
Justice Stein contended that the court's failure to explain the
State's burden of proof constituted an error requiring a reversal of
the defendant's murder conviction. Id. at 329, 639 A.2d at 1105
(Stein, J., dissenting).
Justice Stein explained that although the court rectified its sequential error with a curative instruction, the court's failure to instruct the jury as to the State's burden of proof was never cured.
Id. at 332, 639 A.2d at 1107 (Stein,J., dissenting). Emphasizing the
importance of clear, concise jury instructions regarding the burden of proof for a passion/provocation manslaughter jury charge,
Justice Stein faulted the majority for finding that the record, as a
whole, suggested that the jury did not reach an improper verdict.
Id. at 336, 337, 639 A.2d at 1109, 1110 (citation omitted) (SteinJ.,
dissenting). Furthermore, the justice remarked that the court misstated the jury's function concerning passion/provocation manslaughter. Id. at 332, 639 A.2d at 1107 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Specifically, the justice noted that the linguistics of the court's
charge improperly imparted to the jury an instruction to find the
defendant guilty of passion/provocation manslaughter if it had a
reasonable doubt that the defendant killed his wife in the heat of
passion on a reasonable provocation. Id. at 333, 639 A.2d at 1108
(Stein,J., dissenting). Justice Stein asserted that this error, too, was
never corrected. Id. at 332, 639 A.2d at 1107 (Stein,J., dissenting).
Concluding, Justice Stein remarked that when addressing an issue
as critical as jury deliberation, the court should not permit ambiguous language. Id. at 337-38, 639 A.2d at 1110 (Stein,J., dissenting).
Building upon Justice Stein's dissent, Justice Clifford wrote
separately to reiterate the dissent's disapproval of the majority
opinion's grammatical shortcomings. Id. at 338, 639 A.2d at 1110
(citation omitted) (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford noted
that the court could have easily avoided error by utilizing the plain,
direct language found in the Model Jury Charge which was in effect at the time of defendant's trial. Id. at 341, 639 A.2d at 1112
(Clifford, J., dissenting). Signaling the potential impact of vague
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language, Justice Clifford concluded that the court should not tolerate unclear wording in jury instructions. Id.
Unfortunately, the court appeared to minimize the importance of clear, concise jury instructions by arguing over possible
interpretations of the trial court's jury charge. The court's vigorous debate over trivialities, however, does reflect the problems created by vague jury charges. The court must use precise language in
a jury instruction to avoid the need for a jury to make its own assumptions. The problems generated by having a jury make assumptions are illustrated by the fact that seven justices analyzed the
same jury charge in three different ways and reached opposite results. It is likely that these debates also occurred within the jury
deliberations. Thus, the dissent correctly concluded that a prejudicial error occurred.
Megan Gajewski

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INJUNcrvE POWER AND FREE SPEECHSTATE
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PROTESTERS IS CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS CONTENT-NEUTRAL AND NARROWLY TAILORED To MEET GOVERNMENT INTER-

EsTS-Hoizon Health Center v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126, 638 A.2d

1260 (1994).
Horizon Health Center is a non-profit family-planning clinic
in Jersey City. Id. at 132, 638 A.2d at 1262. The Center provides
various medical services including pre-natal care, family planning,
well-baby care, and support and educational counseling. On Saturdays, along with its other family-planning services, the Center also
performs first trimester abortions. All patients visiting the facility
on Saturdays access the building through the entrance on Bergen
Avenue.
In August 1990, the anti-abortion protest group, Helpers of
God's Precious Infants, instituted prayer vigils on Saturdays across
the street from the Bergen Avenue entrance to the Center. Id., 638
A.2d at 1263. The activities of the protesters included "sidewalk

counseling" to patients entering the facility. The protesters warned
that the Center would "murder," "kill," and "tear the arms and
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legs" off babies. Additionally, the protesters often distributed pamphlets with pictures of bloodied, dismembered fetuses.
On Saturday, October 19, 1991, the protesters gathered in
front of the clinic and held a mass demonstration. Id. at 133, 638
A.2d at 1263. On the day of the protest, 120 to 140 protesters arrived, holding wooden crucifixes and placards exclaiming "Abortion Kills Children" and "Babies Killed at 710 Bergen Avenue." An
archbishop and a priest led the mass of protesters who sang,
chanted, and recited the rosary while blocking the entrance and
shouting comments to the Center's patients. The Center did not
have prior notice of the protest and was able to assist few of the
visitors scheduled for services. Id. at 133, 134, 638 A.2d at 1263. As
a result of the protest, twenty-five out of forty-five women were unable to make their appointments for that date. Id. at 134, 638 A.2d
at 1263.
In response to the demonstration, the Center filed a complaint requesting an injunction against the activities of the protesters. Id., 638 A.2d at 1264. The Chancery Division first issued a
temporary restraining order and, after a plenary hearing, granted a
permanent injunction. Id. at 134, 135, 638 A.2d at 1264. The
court determined that the protestors had prevented visitors of the
Center from exercising the right to obtain general health care and,
more specifically, from exercising the privacy right to receive abortion services. Id. at 135, 638 A.2d at 1264. The court opined that
the public interests in preserving medical standards, preventing
trespass on private property, and promoting public safety by controlling traffic all justified restrictions on the magnitude and loudness of the demonstration. Id.
The trial court ordered the protest group and its affiliates to
refrain from trespassing and picketing on the Center's property.
Id. The court further mandated that the protesters desist from disrupting, harassing, or intimidating the staff or anyone entering the
facility. Id. at 136, 638 A.2d 1264. In particular, the court prohibited the protesters from directing epithets, insults, or any loud,
abusive statements at anyone who works at or visits the facility. Id.
The court also limited the demonstrators' activities to the sidewalk
on the opposite side of the street from the Center. Id. Finally, the
court enjoined the protestors from intentionally interfering with
traffic on the premises and from barring ingress to or egress from
the Center. Id., 638 A.2d at 1264-65.
The appellate division upheld the lower court's injunction after considering a free-speech challenge under both the NewJersey
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and United States Constitutions. Id. at 136, 638 A.2d at 1265 (citing Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo, 263 N.J. Super. 200, 622 A.2d
891 (App. Div. 1993)). The court reasoned that the injunction was
valid because the restrictions were content-neutral and narrowly
tailored to achieve the governmental concern in protecting the
public interests at stake. Id. (citing Felicissimo, 263 N.J. Super. at
214-17, 622 A.2d 891). The court also found that the restrictions
left open ample alternative means of communication for the
protesters. Id. (citing Felicissimo, 263 N.J. Super. at 214-17, 622 A.2d
891). The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to determine whether the trial court had authority to issue the injunction and to scrutinize whether the injunction was properly
supported under a First Amendment free-speech challenge. Id. at
136-37, 638 A.2d at 1265 (citing Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo,
134 N.J. 480, 634 A.2d 527 (1993)).
Justice Clifford, writing for an unanimous court, first evaluated whether the permanent injunction was validly issued. Id. at
137, 638 A.2d at 1265. The justice asserted that granting injunctive
relief has always fallen within the discretion of equitable courts. Id.
Although states have traditionally drafted legislation to restrict
speech in public forums, the court rejected the notion that only
legislative activity can create such regulations. Id. at 137-38, 638
A.2d at 1265. Justice Clifford cited examples from other jurisdictions and other areas of the law, including the labor and employment arena, where court-authorized injunctions restricting speech
in the public forum were upheld. Id. at 138, 638 A.2d at 1265-66
(citations omitted). Accordingly, the court concluded that trial
courts have authoritative power to grant such injunctions to further government interests even when no violent or otherwise unlawful activity has occurred. Id. at 138-39, 638 A.2d at 1266.
Justice Clifford next considered whether the trial court correctly balanced the demonstrator's free-speech rights against the
public policy interests. Id. at 139, 638 A.2d at 1266. The court
listed the interests being protected as the accessibility and maintenance of medical health services, the protection of private property, and the promotion of public safety. Id. As the injunction
contained a content-based restriction of speech in a traditional
public forum, the court directed that strict scrutiny would be employed. Id. at 140, 638 A.2d at 1266-67. Thejustice elaborated that
to satisfy a constitutional challenge, the restriction must have been
necessary to further compelling state interests and have been narrowly drawn to reach those specific goals. Id. (citations omitted).
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The court applied a standard requiring the time, place, and manner restrictions to be reasonable, content-neutral, and capable of
leaving open ample alternative means of communication. Id., 638
A.2d at 1267 (citation omitted).
Applying the above standard, Justice Clifford first examined
whether the restrictions were content-neutral. Id. The court defined content-neutral restrictions as limitations that focus on legitimate interests and avoid regulating expressive activity to stifle
disagreeable messages. Id. at 14041, 638 A.2d at 1267 (citations
omitted). Relying on the authority of other jurisdictions, the court
concurred that placing restrictions upon anti-abortion protesters
can be supported on grounds unrelated to the viewpoints of such
action. Id. at 141-42, 638 A.2d at 1268 (citations omitted). Justice
Clifford reasoned that the trial court did not grant the injunction
to quell pro-life statements but to safeguard the valid public interests needing protection. Id. at 143, 638 A.2d at 1268.
In the next step of the inquiry, Justice Clifford examined the
government interests being preserved in order to determine
whether they warranted protection. Id. The court did not follow
the appellate court's interpretation of the interests at stake announcing that the appellate court erred by recognizing the privacy
right to abortion as a legitimate, government interest. Id. at 144,
638 A.2d at 1269 (citation omitted). Justice Clifford elected to remove that concern from consideration. Id.
Instead, the court first assessed the interests relating to the
preservation of medical standards and the accessibility of medical
services including abortion. Id. at 144, 638 A.2d at 1268. The
court noted that NewJersey has always highly prioritized the maintenance of health standards. Id. at 144-45, 638 A.2d at 1269. Justice Clifford insisted that the Center's ability to perform safe
procedures deserved protection because such activity is of a type
which furthers the promotion of health standards. Id. at 145, 638
A.2d at 1269. Thus, the court concluded that the government interest addressed by the injunction was clearly legitimate. Id. at 146,
638 A.2d at 1270.
Following this discussion, Justice Clifford addressed the protection of private property interests. Id. The court elaborated on
NewJersey's longstanding policy of granting equitable relief for interference with property rights. Id. (citation omitted). By blocking
the only entrance to the Center, the court reasoned, the demonstrators did interfere with private property rights. Id. at 147, 638
A.2d at 1270 (citation omitted). Therefore, the court found the
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injunction's reference to trespass valid because it embodied the legitimate government interest in protecting private property. Id. As
the blocking of the entrance to the facility also created traffic
hazards and prevented the free flow of traffic, the court concluded
that the protection of public safety was a valid government interest
as well. Id. (citations omitted).
After finding all the government concerns justifiable, the
court proceeded to scrutinize whether the restrictions intended to
safeguard the interests were narrowly drawn. Id. at 147-48, 638
A.2d at 1270. Justice Clifford articulated the general standard for
regulating expressive activity which dictates that a restriction cannot burden speech more than is necessary to further the government's interests. Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, the court
explained that injunctions require a balancing of rights on a case
by case basis, and furthermore, the restrictions are to be in specific
terms and in reasonable detail. Id. at 148, 638 A.2d at 1270 (citation omitted). The court then applied these governing rules to
assess the reasonableness of the manner and place restrictions of
the injunction. Id., 638 A.2d at 1271.
First, Justice Clifford considered the manner restrictions and
delineated which part of the injunction specifically dealt with
them. Id. The court explained that the manner restrictions included both the forbiddance of loud and abusive language as well
as the ban on gathering, picketing, intimidating or harassing people at the Center. Id. While the appellate court concluded that
the injunction required some modification, Justice Clifford pronounced that the restrictions could be narrowly tailored to an even
greater extent. Id. at 149, 638 A.2d at 1271.
The court opined that the restrictions should be focused more
on the actual problems created by the noise of the protest - that
the loudness had a detrimental effect on staff and patients inside
the clinic. Id. In relation to the problems posed, the court recommended that the injunction follow a Jersey City ordinance forbidding noise disturbances on streets adjacent to hospitals. Id. at 150,
638 A.2d at 1271. The court prescribed that the injunction should
only limit the protestors from producing noises loud enough to
annoy the patients and disrupt the medical services provided by
the Center. Id.
In contrast, the court upheld the validity of the place restrictions, which forbid the demonstrators from trespassing on the
Center's property, blocking passage to the Center, and interfering
with the flow of traffic. Id., 638 A.2d at 1272. Justice Clifford con-
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sidered these restrictions supportable because they were narrowly
tailored and focused on meeting the interests of protecting health
standards, public safety, and private property. Id. The court, however, did not similarly classify the restriction confining the protestors to the sidewalk across the street. Id. at 151, 638 A.2d at 1272.
The court deemed that directive overly broad and instead interjected a more permissive restriction allowing the demonstrators
some form of acceptable expression near the entrance to the
Center. Id. at 152-53, 638 A.2d at 1272-73 (citation omitted).
By modifying the injunction in this way, the court professed
that the demonstrators were guaranteed ample alternative channels of communication. Id. at 153, 638 A.2d at 1273. Justice Clifford averred that, after modification of the injunction as specified,
the protestors would be able to demonstrate in a civil and reasonable way near the entrance to the facility. Id. Justice Clifford added that the protestors could then express themselves less
restrictively from across the street and conduct sidewalk counseling, hold vigils, and carry placards from that location. Id.
The court concluded by stating that the modifications would
legitimately balance the free-speech rights of the demonstrators
against the government interests. Id. As the rights of all the parties
involved had been adequately protected by the above standard applied to First Amendment challenges, the court considered a separate inquiry under provisions of the New Jersey Constitution
unnecessary. Id. at 154, 638 A.2d at 1273-74 (citations omitted).
It is interesting thatJustice Clifford would so confidently assert
that all of the rights of all of the parties involved had been addressed and amply safeguarded. What is glaringly apparent is the
outright evasion of one of the major issues provoked by this controversy. Specifically, the court chose to avoid balancing women's
rights to abortion against the protesters' rights to free speech.
And, sadly enough, the court's precedent prevents lower courts in
New Jersey from evaluating the privacy right issues in this area.
The decision to base the opinion on safe and traditional
grounds, namely constitutional and first amendment issues, is disappointing when remembering that the NewJersey Supreme Court
has always led the forefront in tackling controversial topics. Additionally, at a time when a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is surrounded by so many perplexities and so few certainties,
a scrutiny of this right, in contrast to another constitutional right,
would have done much to erase the cloudiness. Furthermore,
other decisions, including one delivered by a New Jersey court,
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have chosen to address the privacy rights involved rather than hide
solely behind the free-speech challenge. See, e.g., State v. Cannizzaro, 217 N.J. Super. 623, 526 A.2d 741 (App. Div. 1987); Right to
Life Advocates, Inc. v. Aaron Women's Clinic, 737 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988).
The abortion dilemma has always provoked much debate and
discord. Violent protests on the private property of abortion centers abound and promise to continue. The murder of Dr. David
Gunn in Florida symbolizes the passion and heated emotions still
permeating the controversy. Although the court did much to secure a woman's right to abortion by upholding the injunction
against the protesters, a discussion of that very right protected
would have served citizens far better than a mere consideration of
the government's interests needing protection. Such a discussion
may also have helped to establish, once and for all, what exactly are
the boundaries of that privacy right as it coexists with governmental interests.
Gina Mendola

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW-THE ANTI-BIAS SuBDOES NOT IMPERMISSIBLY BURDEN FREE EXPRESSION, BUT RATHER REGuLATES
SECTION OF THE CRIMINAL HARASSMENT STATUTE

CONDUCT ONLY AND IS, THEREFORE,

CONSTITUTIONAL-State v.

Mortimer, 135 N.J. 517, 641 A.2d 257 (1994).
On August 23 1991, David Mortimer, defendant, and two
others spray-painted the words "Dots U Smell" on the garage door
of a family of Pakistani ancestry living in East Brunswick. Id. at 523,
641 A.2d at 260. Defendant was charged and indicted for two violations of the New Jersey harassment statute. The pertinent section
of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 reads:
Except as provided in subsection d, a person commits a
petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass another he:
a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in
offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause
annoyance of alarm;

1994]

SURVEY

475

b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or
c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such person. A communication under subsection a. may be
deemed to have been made either at the place where it
originated or at the place where it was received.
d. A person commits a crime of fourth degree if in committing
an offense under this section, he acted, at least in part, with ill
will, hatred, or bias toward, and with a purpose to intimidate, an
individual or group of individuals because of race, color, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.
Id. at 523-24, 641 A.2d at 260. The indictment's first count charged
the defendant with painting a swastika on the car of a Jewish family, while count two concerned the spray-painting incident. Id. at
524, 641 A.2d at 260.
As part of a negotiated agreement, defendant pled guilty to
count two in return for the State's recommendation that the trial
judge dismiss count one and limit any penal sentence to a probationary term not exceeding five years. Id. Before the trial court
sentenced Mortimer, however, the United States Supreme Court
decided R-A. V v. City of St. PauL Id. (citing R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)). That decision struck down a hate-crime
ordinance similar to the one Mortimer was charged with violating,
thus Mortimer moved for a withdrawal of his plea and a dismissal
of the indictment. Id. The trial judge agreed that defendant's First
Amendment rights had been violated, as in R.A.V, and granted
defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments. Id., 641 A.2d at
261.
The State initially appealed to the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, but then sought direct certification from the
supreme court. Id. The court granted certification believing an
important free speech challenge was presented against the harassment statute, as well as under the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at
524-25, 641 A.2d at 261 (citing State v. Mortimer, 133 N.J. 412, 627
A.2d 1124 (1993)). Justice Clifford, writing for a unanimous court,
concluded that the statute was constitutional. Id. at 523, 641 A.2d
at 260. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial
court, reinstated the indictment, and remanded the case to the
Law Division for further disposition. Id. at 538, 641 A.2d at 268.
The justice began his analysis by distinguishing the St. Paul
ordinance in R.A. V from the New Jersey harassment statute. Id. at
525, 641 A.2d at 261. Justice Clifford noted that the St. Paul ordi-
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nance impermissably burdened expression whereas subsection d of
the New Jersey statute only punished conduct. Id. (citing R.A. V,
112 S. Ct. 2538). Thejustice continued that the St. Paul enactment
punished the expression of hatred itself, while subsection d operated as a penalty-enhancement or victim-selection provision. Id.
The court emphasized that before subsection d was even applicable, a defendant must first have committed some harassing act as
defined by subsections a, b, and c. Id. at 526, 641 A.2d at 261.
Justice Clifford propounded that unlike the St. Paul ordinance,
subsections a-d did not create a separate substantive offense punishing the expression of hate. Id.
Bolstering the court's reasoning, Justice Clifford noted that
the United States Supreme Court upheld a similar penalty-enhancement statute in Wisconsin v. MitchelL Id., 641 A.2d at 261-62
(citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993)). The justice
recalled the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Wisconsin statute
was aimed at unprotected conduct and not expression. Id., 641
A.2d at 262. The justice explained that the Supreme Court ruled
that acts of physical violence and assault are not expressive acts as
contemplated by the First Amendment and thus the Wisconsin statute was permissible. Id. at 527, 641 A.2d at 262.
Finding further support in state case law, the court listed a
number of decisions from other state's courts that sustained various penalty-enhancement statutes against free speech attacks. Id.
(citations omitted). Thejustice cited a New York case upholding a
statute that increased the offense of simple harassment to that of
aggravated harassment if a bias motive was present. Id. (citing People v. Miccio, 589 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Crim. Ct. 1992)). Justice Clifford
also noted two California cases, a Missouri case, and a Vermont
case, all of which allowed penalty-enhancement provisions if an act
was committed for any one of several enumerated factors. Id. (citations omitted).
The court concluded that subsection d, like the Wisconsin statute, was directed at the purpose or motivation behind a certain act.
Id. at 527-28, 641 A.2d at 262. The court stressed that under subsection d, a person could harbor ill will, hatred, or bigotry toward
anyone or any group, without the fear of criminal prosecution. Id.
at 528, 641 A.2d at 262. The justice quickly added, however, that
what a person may not do is act on those feelings in a harassing,
unlawful manner. Id.
The court next dismissed Mortimer's argument that the statute improperly increased his penalty because of motive. Id. The
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court reiterated that the statute does not punish discrimination but
merely acts of discrimination. Id. at 529, 641 A.2d at 263. Agreeing with the Mitchell court, Justice Clifford insisted that the statute
was proper because the more purposeful criminal conduct is, the
more severely it ought to be punished. Id. at 528, 641 A.2d at 263
(citing Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2199 (quotation omitted)). The court
stated that it is well within the State's authority to punish bias-motivated action. Id. at 529, 641 A.2d at 263. Punishing such conduct,
the justice expounded, is the precise intent of both state and federal anti-discrimination laws. Id. Moreover, the court opined that
the distinct harmful nature of bias crimes allows the Legislature to
punish them more severely. Id. Therefore, the court held that subsection d was valid as it did not regulate protected speech or expression, nor did it improperly punish motive. Id.
Next, Justice Clifford commented that the court has interpreted the New Jersey Constitution to afford broader protection
than that of its federal counterpart. Id. at 529-30, 641 A.2d at 263
(quotation omitted). Justice Clifford propounded, however, that
even construing New Jersey's First Amendment in its most liberal
light, the court could never find the statute offensive to the state
constitution. Id. at 530, 641 A.2d at 263. While the New Jersey
Constitution may give enhanced protection to expression, the justice reminded that subsection d touched only conduct and, thus,
the NewJersey Constitution's free expression provision was useless
to Mortimer. Id.
The court then turned its attention to the issue of whether the
statute was substantially overbroad. Id. Justice Clifford stated that
the proper test was whether the statute touched a significant
amount of constitutionally safeguarded conduct. Id., 641 A.2d at
263-64 (quoting Houston v. Hill, 428 U.S. 451, 458 (1987) (quotation omitted)). Applying this test, the supreme court concluded
that the statute did not represent a threat to protected expression
and had little, if any effect on one's ability to communicate bigoted
thoughts. Id. at 531, 641 A.2d at 264. In addition, the court found
the argument that the statute would have a chilling effect to be
unlikely and speculative. Id.
The court also reviewed the defendant's vagueness challenge.
Id. The court agreed that subsection d was vague but decided to
issue a limiting construction and thus save it from being struck
down. Id. Justice Clifford addressed the grave danger that vague
laws present both to citizens and police, explaining that such statutes provide neither notice to citizens nor guidelines to the author-
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ities. Id. at 532, 641 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted). The court
stated that because criminal laws are given more exacting scrutiny,
the test is whether persons of average intelligence must necessarily
speculate about the statute's meaning and debate as to its application. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Clifford explained that the
court has a clear duty to interpret a statute as constitutional if such
a construction was reasonable. Id. at 533, 534, 641 A.2d at 265,
266.
Thus the supreme court decided to exclude the words "at least
in part with ill will, hatred, or bias toward" from subsection d. Id. at
533, 641 A.2d 265. The court opined that this construction would
define the prohibited conduct with sufficient clarity. Id. at 534,
641 A.2d at 265. Ultimately, the supreme court clearly stated that
subsection d plainly proscribed choosing a victim based on a specific list of immutable characteristics. Id. at 534-35, 641 A.2d at
266.
Finally, the court turned to the defendant's last argument,
concerning the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 536, 641 A.2d at
266-67. Defendant claimed that subsection d deprived him of
equal protection of the laws because it discriminated based upon
the ideas that people believe and express. Id. The justice opined
that the statute need only pass simple rationality review because it
did not touch any fundamental right (including the First Amendment) but merely regulated conduct. Id. at 537, 641 A.2d at 267.
Having ruled in previous decisions that the State possesses a legitimate interest in safeguarding the safety, health, and welfare of its
citizenry, the court found sufficient the Legislative judgment that
hate-based crimes exact a greater toll on society than ordinary
crimes. Id. (citing Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 155-56,
159, 445 A.2d 353 (1982)). Noting the judicial deference paid to
such legislative determinations, Justice Clifford declined from finding the statute arbitrary or capricious and rejected the Equal Protection challenge. Id.
In conclusion, the court cautioned that the decision to uphold
subsection d should not be read as an invitation to suppress unpopular views or ideas. Id. at 538, 641 A.2d at 267. The court acknowledged that in some cases evidence of a defendant's biased thoughts
could be relevant to prove that victim selection was accomplished
based on the victim's immutable status, and thus in violation of the
statute. Id. The court warned, however, that absent a close nexus
between the defendant's expression of ideas and the predicate offense, the evidence's probative value was substantially outweighed
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by the risk of undue prejudice and should not be admitted at trial.
Id. The court expressed confidence that a competent application
of Evidence Rule 403, weighing probative value of the evidence
against its prejudicial effect, would prevent any abuse of subsection
d. Id.
In Mortimer, the New Jersey Supreme Court properly recognized the validity of the State's anti-bias statute in general, and subsection d in particular. As the court indicated, the case is readily
distinguishable from R.A. V because the New Jersey statute only
proscribes conduct, not expression. The defendant's point that a
free society cannot punish one for his or her ideas represents an
obvious truth. The court, however, was wise to recognize the vacuousness of that argument in this case. If Justice Clifford had allowed the defense's argument to prevail, the Legislature's efforts to
thwart the evils of conduct designed to injure a particular segment
of society would have been severely hampered. Furthermore, support for the defense's theory would allow a potentially violent and
destructive segment of society great latitude.
Justice Clifford also wisely acknowledged the potential to
abuse subsection d and misuse it to muzzle unpopular ideas. In
issuing a strong warning to trial courts, directing them to examine
carefully any evidence of beliefs or expression, the court has struck
a proper balance. A free society cannot allow the majority to unduly trammel the rights of any minority, whether that minority be a
member of subsection d's protective classes or an individual such
as Mortimer who holds unpopular beliefs. In issuing a ruling that
condemns conduct meant to harass, while at the same time protecting expression by narrowly limiting punishment to acts and not
thoughts, the court has sought to protect the rights of both types of
minorities.
Robert Attanasio
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ARBITRATION-STANDARD OF REVIEW-LEGISLATED STANDARD OF
GREAT DEFERENCE TO ARBITRATOR'S GOOD FAITH DETERMINATIONS PERMITS COURTS TO VACATE AwARDs ONLY IF PROCURED

By FRAUD OR CORRUPTION, AND TO MODIFY AwARDS ONLY IF TO
DO SO CORRECTS NO MORE THAN CERTAIN STATUTORILY DE-

MIsTAKEs-Tretina Printing Corp. v. Fitzpatrick & Associates, Inc., 135 N.J. 349, 640 A.2d 788 (1994).
FINED

For a guaranteed maximum price ("GMP") of $2,566,050, Fitzpatrick & Associates, Inc. ("Fitzpatrick") agreed to design and
build a printing plant and offices for Tretina Printing Corporation
("Tretina"). Id. at 352, 640 A.2d at 789. Included in the GMP was
an allowance for corrective work, as well as a $200,000 construction-manager's fee, payable if Fitzpatrick completed its obligations
under the contract without a breach. Id., 640 A.2d at 789. To address the potential for corrective work, the parties agreed that Tretina could hold back an amount equal to 150% of any projected
remediation cost. This retainage would be released to Fitzpatrick
upon correction of the unsatisfactory condition. Further, Fitzpatrick and Tretina stipulated that any unresolved controversies between them would be submitted to an arbitrator, whose decision
would be final. Before Fitzpatrick completed the project, when all
but $466,231 of the GMP had been paid out, Fitzpatrick and Tretina both activated the construction contract's arbitration clause.
Id. at 353, 640 A.2d at 790.
Fitzpatrick sought arbitration under the terms of the contract
when Tretina declined to disburse one of Fitzpatrick's requests for
payment. Tretina answered by presenting several claims for
shoddy construction and otherwise unsatisfactory work. After taking evidence over twenty-two sessions, including 222 exhibits, an
American Arbitration Association arbitrator produced a written decision, which awarded $269,912.34 to Fitzpatrick and $520,180 to
Tretina on their respective claims.
Tretina moved, as of right, to the superior court for the award
to be confirmed, while Fitzpatrick cross-moved for the award either
to be invalidated or modified. Id. On review, the chancery division
left the arbitrator's decision substantially undisturbed, except for
the disposition of Fitzpatrick's claim for its unpaid constructionmanager's fee. Id. The trial court determined that the arbitrator's
award was defective because it represented the fee as an item of
retainage, which the contract specified it was not. Id. at 353-54, 640
A.2d at 790. What the arbitrator should have done after he had
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calculated Tretina's damages, the chancery division determined,
was report Tretina's award as net of the full amount remaining in
the retainage fund. Id. at 354, 640 A.2d at 790. The court concluded that the arbitrator effectively treated the construction-manager's fee as an item for Fitzpatrick to repay to Tretina, rather than
a forfeiture as the contract provided. Id. at 353-54, 640 A.2d at 790.
The court reasoned that either the arbitrator had simply
erred, or that he had intended that the parties would recognize, as
a matter of course, that Fitzpatrick was to have the full benefit of
the accumulated retainage. Id. at 354, 640 A.2d at 790. Finding
the arbitrator's description of the award ambiguous, the chancery
court reformulated the award to conform with what it determined
were the arbitrator's intentions. Id. Consequently, the trial court
modified the award to net Tretina $61,369.66, and not the
$260,267.66 the arbitrator had originally entered. Id.
Tretina appealed, viewing as abuse of discretion the trial
court's election to markedly reduce the award, rather than simply
order the arbitrator to provide clarification. Id. The appellate division studied the contract and the arbitration record, together with
NewJersey's Arbitration Act ("the Act"), and decided that the remedy the trial court had fashioned went beyond the modification
that the Act sanctioned. Id. Rather, the court of appeals concluded that some claims were decided against the weight of the
evidence, and that the award created benefits and burdens for
which the parties never bargained. Id., 640 A.2d at 790-91. For
those reasons, the appellate division determined that section 24-8
of the Act and the standard of judicial review that the New Jersey
Supreme Court had announced earlier in Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay
Hotel & Casino, Inc., required the court to vacate the award altogether. Id., 640 A.2d at 791 (citing Perini, 129 N.J 479, 610 A.2d
364 (1992)).
The NewJersey Supreme Court granted certification to reconsider the two-year-old Perinistandard that controlled a court's review of private-sector arbitration awards. Id. at 352, 640 A.2d at 789
(citing Tretina Printing Corp. v. Fitzpatrick & Assoc., Inc., 132 N.J.
442, 627 A.2d 1147 (1993)). On reflection, the high court decided
that the Act imposed a standard of great deference, precisely as
ChiefJustice Wilentz had described in the Periniconcurrence. Tretina, 135 N.J. at 352, 640 A.2d at 789. As a result, the court reversed the appellate division's decision, and reinstated the
arbitrator's award. Id. at 365, 640 A.2d at 796.
In a four-to-three per cuiam opinion, in which the Chief Jus-
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tice and Justices Clifford, Pollock, and Garibaldi joined, the court
began by surveying the legislated bounds of judicial review of private-contract arbitration awards. Id. at 354-55, 640 A.2d at 791.
Parties to an arbitrated dispute, the court recounted, may petition
the superior court to confirm the award within three months. Id.
(citing N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7). Once the award is placed in review, the
majority noted, the Act authorizes dispositions other than confirmation. Id. at 355, 640 A.2d at 791. The court recognized that trial
courts may vacate awards which resulted from an arbitrator's fraud,
corruption, or grossly defective exercise of power. Id. (citing
N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8). In addition, the court reported, awards may be
modified to correct evident mathematical errors and misdescribed
references to persons, objects, or property, or to correct the form
of an award in a way that does not alter the arbitrator's decision on
the merits. Id. (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:24-9). In general, however, the
majority cautioned that in promulgating the Act, the legislature
made clear its intention to sharply constrain a court's authority to
an disturb arbitrator's good faith pronouncement. Id., 640 A.2d at
791.
Dissatisfied with the lower courts' failure to agree on how the
Act should be applied to fix what each had perceived to be a defective decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court tacitly acknowledged
the merit of responding to the parties' fundamental question regarding the extent to which an arbitrator's award can withstand a
court's review. Id. at 356, 640 A.2d at 791. The New Jersey
Supreme Court prefaced the answer to that question by revisiting
the decision in Perini. Id., 640 A.2d at 791-92. In Perini, the court
recalled, the appellant construction management firm charged
that the arbitrator's substantial adverse award violated the established rules of contract law. Id., 640 A.2d at 791 (citing Perini, 129
N.J. at 484, 610 A.2d 364). The majority noted that the Perini court
was divided on the degree of the mistake of law. Id. at 356-58, 640
A.2d at 792 (citations omitted). The court explained that the legislature intended the Act to be the benchmark for vacating awards
that exceeded an arbitrator's powers, or that were procured by undue means. Id. A plurality of the Perinicourt, the majority summarized, agreed that mere mistakes of law alone were insufficient to
vacate an award, and settled on a standard of judicial review that
would uphold 'awards unless the arbitrators clearly mistook the
legal rule. Id. at 356-57, 640 A.2d at 792 (citation omitted). The
Tretina court further observed that *the Perini standard required
that the error be so glaring as to defeat the arbitrator's intent, or to
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imply fraud or misconduct. Id. at 357, 640 A.2d at 792 (citation
omitted).
The majority recollected that three dissenting justices concurred in the Periniplurality's standard, yet Would have vacated the
award on the grounds that the standard had been satisfied. Id. at
358, 640 A.2d at 792. In contrast, the court recounted, Chief Justice Wilentz concurred in the judgment but argued that the Act
contemplated that arbitration awards should be final, and not reviewable by the courts absent corruption, fraud, or some other
wrong. Id. at 357, 640 A.2d at 792 (citation omitted). The Tretina
court announced that a majority of the court now acknowledged
the persuasiveness of the Chief Justice's view in Perini. Id. at 359,
640 A.2d at 793. Therefore, echoing the Perini concurrence, the
Tretina court recapitulated that the new standard requires that an
arbitrator's award only be vacated for corruption, fraud or other
wrongdoing. Id. at 358, 640 A.2d at 793 (citation omitted). The
court emphasized that the Act only allows correction or modification of specific mistakes. Id. The majority explained, however, that
the parties can contract for more expansive judicial review. Id.
Finding not a scintilla of evidence of arbitrator misconduct in the
present case, the Tretina court concluded that fidelity to the Act
required reinstatement of the arbitrator's award. Id. at 358-59, 360,
640 A.2d at 793.
The majority continued the opinion by refuting the dissent's
contention that there was precedent not inconsistent with the Act
that empowered courts to remand ambiguous awards to the arbitrator for clarification. Id. at 359-65, 640 A.2d at 793-96. The majority summarily rejected the proposition that any part of the Act
envisioned the judicial remedy of remand. Id. at 359-60, 640 A.2d
at 793-94. The court observed that under section 24-9 of the Act,
which controlled a court's authority to correct or modify awards,
even if a miscalculation was facially apparent, the extent of the
modification the Act allowed was simple correction. Id. at 360, 610
A.2d at 793-94. The majority asserted that a judicially perceived
need to affect the merits of the dispute could not be executed as a
modification within the meaning the Act. Id. Because the adjustment sought in Tretinawould have eliminated three-quarters of the
award, the majority emphasized that no mere miscalculation was at
issue, and hence relief was not available. Id., 640 A.2d at 794.
Moreover, because remand was nowhere mentioned in the
Act, the high court posited that courts reviewing private-sector arbitrations could not appeal to any common law authority that sanc-
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tioned resubmission of ambiguous awards. Id. at 360-61, 640 A.2d
at 794. The majority reasoned that remand was unavailable in the
arbitration context because once arbitrators issued their decisions,
their commissions terminated absolutely. Id. at 361, 640 A.2d at
794. As for the one Third Circuit decision cited by the dissent that
supported the discernment of a fundamental power to remand, the
court opined that the case was inapposite on two grounds. Id.
First, the court noted that in Tretina,an arbitration statute, and not
the common law, controlled the parties' rights. Id. Second, unlike
Pennsylvania's public policy that had guided the circuit court, the
Tretina majority found New Jersey's arbitration statute preferred finality over resubmission. Id.
Similarly inapposite, the court avowed, were federal labor law
cases whose rulings conferred primacy on arbitration. Id. at 362,
640 A.2d at 794-95. The court stressed that the relationship between parties to a collective bargaining agreement was wholly different from that between parties to a private contract. Id. at 362,
640 A.2d at 795. Labor and management, the court observed, were
bound to each other by necessity, whereas parties in the private
sector contracted voluntarily. Id. at 362-63, 640 A.2d at 795. This
absence of choice, the majority concluded, had engendered a public policy favoring labor peace, and accounted for federal courts'
preference for resubmitting issues to arbitrators, even though federal law did not compel that result. Id. at 363, 640 A.2d at 795. By
contrast, the court suggested, reviewing a court's enforcement of
somewhat flawed private-sector arbitrations, freely entered into,
poses no substantial threat either to the viability of commercial
contracting or to arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution
method. Id.
The Tretina court cautioned, however, that resubmission could
be an appropriate judicial response if arbitrators had not exhausted their authority. Id. The court explained that an arbitrator
may retain authority if an issue has not been submitted or decided
in the first instance, or when there is a genuine uncertainty about
the duties set forth in the award. Id. at 363 (citing Jersey City Police
Officers Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Jersey City, 257 NJ. Super. 6, 607
A.2d 1314 (App. Div. 1992)). Similarly, the Tretinacourt reiterated
that reviewing courts sitting in their capacity as parens patriacould
ground the vacation of arbitration awards in public policy. Id. at
365, 640 A.2d at 796 (citing Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 477 A.2d
1257 (1984)).
The majority, however, confirmed that all issues submitted in
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the present case had been ruled upon, and the award unambiguously obliged one party to pay a sum of money to the other. Id. at
364, 640 A.2d at 795. In conclusion, the Tretina court averred that
to judicially require arbitrators to explain mere ambiguities in their
mathematical analyses would undermine the legislature's endorsement of private parties' reliance on arbitration to resolve their disputes, and hence would violate public policy. Id., 640 A.2d at 79596.
Justice Clifford authored a brief and acerbic concurrence that
acknowledged the justice's migration from the Perini plurality to
the Chief Justice's opinion. Id. at 365-67, 640 A.2d at 796-97 (Clifford, J., concurring). Candidly, the justice revealed that the
change was not due to some sudden intellectual enrichment or
cognitive awareness. Id. at 366-67, 640 A.2d at 797 (Clifford, J.,
concurring). Rather, Justice Clifford stated that further reflection
had compelled a change of mind. Id. at 367, 640 A.2d at 797 (Clifford, J., concurring).
Justice Stein, on the other hand, issued a dissent that regretted
the majority's election to announce a new standard of judicial review. Id. (Stein, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the new
standard was unnecessary, and asserted that the issue in Tretina was
the reviewing court's authority to remand awards to arbitrators for
clarification. Id. The justice concluded that settled principles of
law have established that New Jersey courts posses the inherent authority to remand. Id. at 371, 640 A.2d at 799-800 (Stein, J.,
dissenting).
The dissent, however, agreed with the majority that, on its
face, the award exhibited no egregious errors of law. Id. at 368,
640 A.2d at 798 (Stein,J., dissenting). Justice Stein contended that
the chancery division had correctly identified the arbitrator's
award as a retainage. Id. at 369-70, 640 A.2d at 798-99 (Stein, J.,
dissenting). The dissent insisted that where the contract clearly
distinguished between the concepts of retainage and constructionmanagement fees, the award's mere characterization of the fee as
retainage could not confuse these two items. Id. at 370, 640 A.2d at
798-99 (Stein, J., dissenting). Justice Stein, therefore, implied that
it could not reasonably be asserted that the arbitrator had demonstrated his intent to effectuate the contract's provision for crediting
retainage against the cost of corrective work. Id., 640 A.2d at 799
(Stein, J., dissenting).
Denominating that gap as an evident mistake statutorily susceptible to correction, the dissent adverted to the well-settled tenet
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that courts may remand arbitration awards for the narrow purpose
of clarification. Id. at 371, 640 A.2d at 799-800 (Stein, J., dissenting). Justice Stein buttressed the dissent by noting that the Third
Circuit had similarly directed an arbitrator to clarify whether or
not the amount awarded included allowances for sums paid during
the pendency of the arbitration. Id. at 372, 640 A.2d at 800 (Stein,
J., dissenting) (citing La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378
F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1967)).
Similarly, the justice noted, courts reviewing arbitrated labor
law disputes routinely resubmit issues to arbitrators without concern that doing so effectively restarted the arbitration. Id. at 372,
640 A.2d at 800 (Stein, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). What
the cases made evident, the dissent maintained, was that the majority improperly portrayed remandment of plainly ambiguous awards
as encroachment on the deferential standard of review the majority
embraced. Id. at 373, 640 A.2d at 800 (Stein, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Stein posited, as a practical matter the dissent's view
implemented the Act's exhortation that a court should modify and
correct an award in order to promote justice. Id., 640 A.2d at 801
(quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:24-9) (Stein, J., dissenting).
Therefore, the dissent concluded that the viability of arbitration as an alternative to litigation is better preserved when courts
can intervene in an the arbitrator's award which fails to adhere to
established legal principles and industry standards. Id. at 374, 640
A.2d at 801 (Stein, J., dissenting) (quoting Perini, 129 N.J at 556,
610 A.2d at 364 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
Accepting as reported the relevant dollar amounts, it certainly
seems as if Tretina Printing Corporation came away from the arbitration with a windfall. Nonetheless, the New Jersey Supreme
Court properly resisted altering the award. Like litigation, privatesector arbitration is not invulnerable to imperfect justice. Arbitration, however, does offer disputants a principled and swifter, more
economical alternative to litigation. But because "ambiguity" is a
qualifier that is impervious to definition, recognizing it as a ground
for displacing awards would compromise arbitration's utility irretrievably. For any more liberal standard of review would render a
contract provision for binding arbitration nugatory.
More deplorable, however, is the prospect of disappointed
parties, financially capable of researching and briefing "ambiguity," playing the money card and wresting more favorable terms
from their poorer adversaries, who opted for arbitration precisely
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because of its affordability. Quite simply, when private parties voluntarily choose arbitration, they have announced their preference
for economy and efficiency over full judicial process. The New
Jersey legislature has legitimized access to that choice, and the Tretina court correctly enforced the bargain the parties made.
Elizabeth Rushing

